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Thursday, May 14, 2020 | History

4 edition of Corporate tax avoidance and high powered incentives found in the catalog.

Corporate tax avoidance and high powered incentives

Mihir A. Desai

Corporate tax avoidance and high powered incentives

by Mihir A. Desai

  • 393 Want to read
  • 20 Currently reading

Published by National Bureau of Economic Research in Cambridge, MA .
Written in English

    Places:
  • Taxation.
    • Subjects:
    • Tax evasion.,
    • Tax shelters.,
    • Executives -- Salaries, etc.,
    • Corporations -- Taxation.

    • Edition Notes

      StatementMihir A. Desai, Dhammika Dharmapala.
      SeriesNBER working paper series ;, working paper 10471, Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;, working paper no. 10471.
      ContributionsDharmapala, Dhammika, National Bureau of Economic Research.
      Classifications
      LC ClassificationsHB1
      The Physical Object
      FormatElectronic resource
      ID Numbers
      Open LibraryOL3476111M
      LC Control Number2005615568

      "Corporate Tax Avoidance and High Powered Incentives," American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings , American Law & Economics Association. Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, "Corporate Tax Avoidance and High Powered Incentives," Working papers , University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. A number of empirical proxies for corporate tax avoidance are computed using financial statement variables, but their relevance is limited for firms that engage in conforming tax avoidance that reduce both book and taxable income. Alternatively, tax shelters and uncertain tax benefits can be used as proxies for aggressive tax avoidance.

      Corporate tax avoidance and high-powered incentives. Mihir A. Desai and Dhammika Dharmapala. Journal of Financial Economics, , vol. 79, issue 1, Date: References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc Citations: View citations in EconPapers () Track citations by RSS feed. Downloads: (external Cited by: This paper analyzes the links between corporate tax avoidance, the growth of highpowered incentives for managers, and the structure of corporate governance. We develop and test a simple model that highlights the role of complementarities between tax sheltering and managerial diversion in determining how highpowered incentives influence tax Author: Mihir A. Desai and Dhammika Dharmapala.

        Corporate tax avoidance is likely to be associated with a high level of earnings management and with high financial opacity in the time-series. On this basis, we hypothesize that analyst coverage is negatively associated with corporate tax avoidance. Our results confirm this conjecture, and are robust to using a firm-fixed-effects model and a quasi-natural experiment to control for potential Author: Guanming He, Helen Mengbing Ren, Richard J. Taffler.   Using a sample of firms experiencing exogenous CEO departures, we investigate whether firms with overconfident CEOs avoid more tax. We find robust evidence of a positive relation between proxies for corporate tax avoidance and CEO overconfidence. Because our empirical tests use a panel of firm-years with exogenous CEO departures and include controls for stationary firm effects as well as Cited by: 5.


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Corporate tax avoidance and high powered incentives by Mihir A. Desai Download PDF EPUB FB2

This paper analyzes the links between corporate tax avoidance and the growth of high-powered incentives for managers. A simple model demonstrates the role of feedback effects between tax sheltering and managerial diversion in determining how high Cited by: Corporate Tax Avoidance and High Powered Incentives Mihir A.

Desai Harvard University and NBER struct an empirical measure of corporate tax avoidance - the component of the book-tax gap not attributable to accounting accruals - and investigate the link be- relationship between high-powered incentives and tax avoidance on average, but is Cited by: Corporate Tax Avoidance and High Powered Incentives Mihir A.

Desai Harvard University and NBER Dhammika Dharmapala University of Connecticut December Abstract This paper analyzes the links between corporate tax avoidance and the growth of high-powered incentives for managers. We develop a simple model that highlights the role ofCited by: Corporate Tax Avoidance and High-Powered Incentives Article in Journal of Financial Economics 79(1) December with 1, Reads How we measure 'reads'.

Corporate Tax Avoidance and High Powered Incentives Mihir A. Desai Harvard University and NBER ([email protected]) Dhammika Dharmapala University of Connecticut ([email protected]) November Abstract This paper analyzes the links between corporate tax avoidance and the growth of high-powered incentives for Size: KB.

Corporate Tax Avoidance and High Powered Incentives Mihir A. Desai, Dhammika Dharmapala. NBER Working Paper No. Issued in May NBER Program(s):Corporate Finance, Public Economics This paper analyzes the links between corporate tax avoidance, the growth of high-powered incentives for managers, and the structure Corporate tax avoidance and high powered incentives book corporate by:   Abstract.

This paper analyzes the links between corporate tax avoidance and the growth of high-powered incentives for managers. We develop a simple model that highlights the role of feedback effects between tax sheltering and managerial diversion in determining how high-powered incentives influence tax sheltering by: CiteSeerX - Document Details (Isaac Councill, Lee Giles, Pradeep Teregowda): This paper analyzes the links between corporate tax avoidance and the growth of highpowered incentives for managers.

We develop a simple model that highlights the role of feedback effects between tax sheltering and managerial diversion in determining how highpowered incentives influence tax sheltering decisions. Desai and Dharmapala (), try to show the links between corporate tax avoidance, the growth of high powered incentives for managers, and the structure of corporate governance.

They developed. This paper analyzes the links between corporate tax avoidance, the growth of high-powered incentives for managers, and the structure of corporate governance. We develop and test a simple model that highlights the role of complementarities between tax sheltering and managerial diversion in determining how high-powered incentives influence tax Cited by: Downloadable.

This paper analyzes the links between corporate tax avoidance, the growth of high-powered incentives for managers, and the structure of corporate governance. We develop and test a simple model that highlights the role of complementarities between tax sheltering and managerial diversion in determining how high-powered incentives influence tax sheltering decisions.

Desai, M. and Dharmapala, A.D. () Corporate Tax Avoidance and High-Powered Incentives. Journal of Financial Economics, 79, This paper analyzes the links between corporate tax avoidance, the growth of highpowered incentives for managers, and the structure of corporate governance.

We develop and test a simple model that highlights the role of complementarities between tax sheltering and managerial diversion in determining how high-powered incentives influence tax sheltering by: Get this from a library. Corporate tax avoidance and high powered incentives.

[Mihir A Desai; Dhammika Dharmapala; National Bureau of Economic Research.] -- "This paper analyzes the links between corporate tax avoidance, the growth of high-powered incentives for managers, and the structure of corporate governance.

We develop and test a simple model that. COVID Resources. Reliable information about the coronavirus (COVID) is available from the World Health Organization (current situation, international travel).Numerous and frequently-updated resource results are available from this ’s WebJunction has pulled together information and resources to assist library staff as they consider how to handle coronavirus.

CiteSeerX - Document Details (Isaac Councill, Lee Giles, Pradeep Teregowda): This paper analyzes the links between corporate tax avoidance, the growth of highpowered incentives for managers, and the structure of corporate governance.

We develop and test a simple model that highlights the role of complementarities between tax sheltering and managerial diversion in determining how highpowered. Abstract.

We examine the link between corporate governance, managerial incentives, and corporate tax avoidance. Similar to other investment opportunities that involve risky expected cash flows, unresolved agency problems may lead managers to engage in more or less corporate tax avoidance than shareholders would otherwise by: This paper analyzes the links between corporate tax avoidance, the growth of highpowered incentives for managers, and the structure of corporate governance.

We develop and test a simple model that highlights the role of complementarities between tax sheltering and managerial diversion in determining how high-powered incentives influence tax Author: Mihir A. Desai and Dhammika Dharmapala.

The Divergence between Book Income and Tax Income: Desai and Dharmapala: w Corporate Tax Avoidance and High Powered Incentives: Crocker and Slemrod: w Corporate Tax Evasion with Agency Costs: Slemrod: w The Economics of Corporate Tax Selfishness: Desai, Dyck, and Zingales: w Theft and Taxes.

Corporate Tax Avoidance and High Powered Incentives. Mihir A. Desai and Dhammika Dharmapala. NoNBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc Abstract: This paper analyzes the links between corporate tax avoidance, the growth of high-powered incentives for managers, and the structure of corporate governance.

We develop and test a simple model that highlights the Cited by:. Corporate Tax Avoidance and High Powered Incentives. A Model of Corporate Income Tax Evasion” Working paper. (). Is There a Link between Executive Compensation and Accounting Fraud?” Working paper. Reconciling Corporation Book and Tax Net Income, Tax YearsAuthor: Mihir Desai and Dhammika Dharmapala.Abstract.

This paper analyzes the links between corporate tax avoidance and the growth of highpowered incentives for managers. We develop a simple model that highlights the role of feedback effects between tax sheltering and managerial diversion in determining how highpowered incentives influence tax sheltering : Mihir A.

Desai and Dhammika Dharmapala.This paper analyzes the links between corporate tax avoidance, the growth of high-powered incentives for managers, and the structure of corporate governance. We develop and test a simple model that highlights the role of complementarities between tax sheltering and managerial diversion in determining how high-powered incentives influence tax Author: Mihir A.

Desai and Dhammika Dharmapala.